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* Server-target driver (Block ST).
*
* Drives the SSH/scp subprocess pipeline that takes a `server_targets` row
* and either tests the connection or runs a deploy on the box. All process
* spawning is funnelled through a single injectable seam (`__setSpawnForTests`)
* so the test suite can drive the lib without actually shelling out.
*
* Design notes:
* - We use the host's `ssh`/`scp` CLI rather than a Node SSH library. It
* keeps the surface tiny (no new deps) and lets the operator manage
* ciphers/algorithms via /etc/ssh/ssh_config like any other server tool.
* - The private key is materialised into a Bun temp file with mode 0600,
* used for the call, then unlinked in a `finally`. Never touches /tmp
* persistently and never sits on disk longer than the call.
* - Host-key verification uses TOFU: on first connect (status='unverified'
* and no host_fingerprint) we accept-new and record the fingerprint.
* Subsequent connects pin against that fingerprint. A mismatch aborts.
*
* Public surface:
* - `testConnection(target)` → returns ok/fail + pinned fingerprint
* - `deployToTarget(target, ctx)`→ uploads env, runs deploy_script
* - `materializeEnv(env)` → render env-vars map to a .env body
*/
import { mkdtemp, writeFile, rm } from "fs/promises";
import { tmpdir } from "os";
import path from "path";
import { decryptValue, renderDotenv } from "./server-targets-crypto";
import type { ServerTarget } from "../db/schema";
export interface SpawnResult {
exitCode: number;
stdout: string;
stderr: string;
}
/**
* Subprocess seam. Production calls `Bun.spawn`; tests override.
*
* Returns the captured stdout/stderr + exit code. `stdin` is optional; when
* provided, it's written and closed before the process is awaited so we can
* pipe a .env body in without a temp file.
*/
export type SpawnFn = (
cmd: string[],
opts: { cwd?: string; stdin?: string; env?: Record<string, string> }
) => Promise<SpawnResult>;
const defaultSpawn: SpawnFn = async (cmd, opts) => {
const proc = Bun.spawn(cmd, {
cwd: opts.cwd,
env: { ...process.env, ...(opts.env || {}) },
stdin: opts.stdin ? "pipe" : "ignore",
stdout: "pipe",
stderr: "pipe",
});
if (opts.stdin) {
proc.stdin?.write(opts.stdin);
proc.stdin?.end();
}
const [stdout, stderr] = await Promise.all([
new Response(proc.stdout).text(),
new Response(proc.stderr).text(),
]);
const exitCode = await proc.exited;
return { exitCode, stdout, stderr };
};
let _spawn: SpawnFn = defaultSpawn;
export function __setSpawnForTests(fn: SpawnFn | null): void {
_spawn = fn ?? defaultSpawn;
}
/**
* Run a fn with the decrypted SSH private key written to a 0600 file in a
* private temp dir. The dir is rm -rf'd in `finally`, no matter what.
*/
async function withKeyFile<T>(
encryptedKey: string,
fn: (keyPath: string) => Promise<T>
): Promise<T> {
const dec = decryptValue(encryptedKey);
if (!dec.ok) {
throw new Error(`decrypt private key: ${dec.error}`);
}
const dir = await mkdtemp(path.join(tmpdir(), "gluecron-st-"));
const keyPath = path.join(dir, "id");
await writeFile(keyPath, dec.plaintext, { mode: 0o600 });
try {
return await fn(keyPath);
} finally {
await rm(dir, { recursive: true, force: true }).catch(() => {});
}
}
/**
* Build the common `ssh` arg list. On a target with no pinned fingerprint we
* pass `accept-new`; once pinned we require strict host-key checking via the
* known-hosts file we materialise alongside the key.
*
* Returns the args up to (but not including) the remote command — the
* caller appends `[user@host, ...cmd]` or scp paths.
*/
function sshBaseArgs(target: ServerTarget, keyPath: string): string[] {
const knownHostsArg = target.hostFingerprint
? // Pinned: hand ssh a known_hosts line via -o KnownHostsCommand-ish
// bypass — easier route is a temp file passed via UserKnownHostsFile.
// We can't easily inline a fingerprint without the full key, so we
// fall back to strict checking against a per-target known_hosts file
// written next to the key. With no host_fingerprint we accept-new.
["-o", "StrictHostKeyChecking=yes"]
: ["-o", "StrictHostKeyChecking=accept-new"];
return [
"-i",
keyPath,
"-o",
"BatchMode=yes",
"-o",
"ConnectTimeout=10",
"-o",
`UserKnownHostsFile=${path.join(path.dirname(keyPath), "known_hosts")}`,
...knownHostsArg,
"-p",
String(target.port),
];
}
/**
* Test connectivity. Returns the host fingerprint (SHA256 of the host key)
* captured via `ssh-keyscan` so the caller can pin it on the row.
*
* Flow:
* 1. ssh-keyscan -p <port> <host> → host key text
* 2. ssh-keygen -lf <keyfile> → SHA256:<fp> fingerprint
* 3. ssh -i <key> user@host 'echo gluecron' → confirms key works
*
* Any step's non-zero exit collapses to {ok:false}. Never throws.
*/
export async function testConnection(
target: ServerTarget
): Promise<
| { ok: true; fingerprint: string }
| { ok: false; error: string; stage: "scan" | "fingerprint" | "auth" }
> {
try {
return await withKeyFile(target.encryptedPrivateKey, async (keyPath) => {
const dir = path.dirname(keyPath);
const scan = await _spawn(
["ssh-keyscan", "-T", "5", "-p", String(target.port), target.host],
{}
);
if (scan.exitCode !== 0 || !scan.stdout.trim()) {
return {
ok: false as const,
error: scan.stderr.trim() || "ssh-keyscan returned nothing",
stage: "scan" as const,
};
}
const knownHostsPath = path.join(dir, "known_hosts");
await writeFile(knownHostsPath, scan.stdout);
const fp = await _spawn(["ssh-keygen", "-lf", knownHostsPath], {});
if (fp.exitCode !== 0) {
return {
ok: false as const,
error: fp.stderr.trim() || "ssh-keygen failed",
stage: "fingerprint" as const,
};
}
// Output format: "<bits> SHA256:<base64> comment (TYPE)"
const match = fp.stdout.match(/SHA256:[A-Za-z0-9+/=]+/);
const fingerprint = match ? match[0] : fp.stdout.trim().split(/\s+/)[1] || "";
const probe = await _spawn(
[
"ssh",
...sshBaseArgs(target, keyPath),
`${target.sshUser}@${target.host}`,
"echo gluecron-ok",
],
{}
);
if (probe.exitCode !== 0 || !probe.stdout.includes("gluecron-ok")) {
return {
ok: false as const,
error: probe.stderr.trim() || "ssh probe failed",
stage: "auth" as const,
};
}
return { ok: true as const, fingerprint };
});
} catch (err) {
return {
ok: false,
error: err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err),
stage: "auth",
};
}
}
export interface DeployContext {
commitSha?: string;
ref?: string;
/** Decrypted env-var map (KEY → value). Render to .env before upload. */
env: Record<string, string>;
}
export interface DeployResult {
ok: boolean;
exitCode: number;
stdout: string;
stderr: string;
}
/**
* Run the deploy on the target box.
*
* Sequence:
* 1. Write env map → /tmp/gluecron-<rand>.env (locally), scp to
* `<deploy_path>/.env.gluecron` on the box (0600 via umask).
* 2. ssh user@host 'cd <deploy_path> && set -a && . ./.env.gluecron \
* && set +a && <deploy_script>'
* 3. Capture stdout+stderr+exit and return.
*
* Never throws — every failure is folded into the DeployResult with the
* stderr line that explains why. Caller is responsible for inserting the
* `server_target_deployments` row.
*/
export async function deployToTarget(
target: ServerTarget,
ctx: DeployContext
): Promise<DeployResult> {
try {
return await withKeyFile(target.encryptedPrivateKey, async (keyPath) => {
const dir = path.dirname(keyPath);
// Materialise known_hosts up front so we can run ssh in strict mode
// for a target that's already been pinned.
if (target.hostFingerprint) {
// We don't have the raw host key, only the fingerprint, so we
// re-scan and verify the fingerprint matches before writing the
// known_hosts file. A mismatch is a hard abort.
const scan = await _spawn(
["ssh-keyscan", "-T", "5", "-p", String(target.port), target.host],
{}
);
if (scan.exitCode !== 0 || !scan.stdout.trim()) {
return {
ok: false,
exitCode: scan.exitCode,
stdout: "",
stderr: `ssh-keyscan: ${scan.stderr.trim() || "no host key returned"}`,
};
}
const knownHostsPath = path.join(dir, "known_hosts");
await writeFile(knownHostsPath, scan.stdout);
const fp = await _spawn(["ssh-keygen", "-lf", knownHostsPath], {});
const live = (fp.stdout.match(/SHA256:[A-Za-z0-9+/=]+/) || [""])[0];
if (!live || live !== target.hostFingerprint) {
return {
ok: false,
exitCode: 255,
stdout: "",
stderr: `host key fingerprint mismatch — pinned=${target.hostFingerprint} live=${live || "<none>"}. Aborting deploy.`,
};
}
}
const dotenv = renderDotenv(ctx.env);
const envPath = path.join(dir, "deploy.env");
await writeFile(envPath, dotenv, { mode: 0o600 });
// scp the .env up. The remote path is fixed for predictability.
const remoteEnv = `${target.deployPath.replace(/\/$/, "")}/.env.gluecron`;
const scp = await _spawn(
[
"scp",
...sshBaseArgs(target, keyPath),
envPath,
`${target.sshUser}@${target.host}:${remoteEnv}`,
],
{}
);
if (scp.exitCode !== 0) {
return {
ok: false,
exitCode: scp.exitCode,
stdout: scp.stdout,
stderr: `scp env: ${scp.stderr.trim()}`,
};
}
const commitExport = ctx.commitSha
? `export GLUECRON_COMMIT_SHA='${ctx.commitSha.replace(/'/g, "")}'; `
: "";
const refExport = ctx.ref
? `export GLUECRON_REF='${ctx.ref.replace(/'/g, "")}'; `
: "";
const remoteCmd =
`cd '${target.deployPath.replace(/'/g, "'\\''")}' && ` +
`set -a && . ./.env.gluecron && set +a && ` +
commitExport +
refExport +
target.deployScript;
const run = await _spawn(
[
"ssh",
...sshBaseArgs(target, keyPath),
`${target.sshUser}@${target.host}`,
remoteCmd,
],
{}
);
return {
ok: run.exitCode === 0,
exitCode: run.exitCode,
stdout: run.stdout,
stderr: run.stderr,
};
});
} catch (err) {
return {
ok: false,
exitCode: -1,
stdout: "",
stderr: err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err),
};
}
}
export { renderDotenv } from "./server-targets-crypto";
/** Test-only access to internal seams. */
export const __test = {
sshBaseArgs,
withKeyFile,
};
|