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ssh-keys.test.ts7.2 KB · 197 lines
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/**
 * SSH keys — CRUD coverage.
 *
 * `src/routes/settings.tsx` is a §4 LOCKED BLOCK, so these tests exercise the
 * public HTTP surface via the app router and assert behavioural contracts
 * (auth guard, accepted key formats, ownership enforcement, list shape) that
 * must be preserved. All mutations are guarded by `requireAuth`, so without a
 * real session the endpoints redirect to `/login` — that redirect is itself
 * the auth-contract we test. DB-backed side-effects only execute when a
 * `DATABASE_URL` is present; otherwise the handler degrades gracefully.
 *
 * Pure-logic tests (fingerprint derivation, key-format validator) replicate
 * the same algorithms used inside the locked route so we catch regressions
 * if the wire format ever changes without adding a test fixture.
 */

import { describe, it, expect } from "bun:test";
import app from "../app";

const HAS_DB = Boolean(process.env.DATABASE_URL);

// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Pure helpers mirroring the locked route's validation logic. Kept in-file
// rather than imported (route is LOCKED, no __test export available).
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

function isValidSshKeyFormat(publicKey: string): boolean {
  return (
    publicKey.startsWith("ssh-rsa ") ||
    publicKey.startsWith("ssh-ed25519 ") ||
    publicKey.startsWith("ecdsa-sha2-")
  );
}

async function computeFingerprint(publicKey: string): Promise<string> {
  const keyData = publicKey.split(" ")[1] || "";
  const hashBuffer = await crypto.subtle.digest(
    "SHA-256",
    new TextEncoder().encode(keyData)
  );
  return (
    "SHA256:" +
    btoa(String.fromCharCode(...new Uint8Array(hashBuffer))).replace(/=+$/, "")
  );
}

// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Pure logic
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

describe("ssh keys — accepted public-key formats", () => {
  it("accepts ssh-ed25519 keys", () => {
    expect(
      isValidSshKeyFormat(
        "ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIEXAMPLEKEYBYTES alice@laptop"
      )
    ).toBe(true);
  });

  it("accepts ssh-rsa keys", () => {
    expect(isValidSshKeyFormat("ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAAB")).toBe(
      true
    );
  });

  it("accepts ecdsa-sha2-* keys", () => {
    expect(
      isValidSshKeyFormat("ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlz")
    ).toBe(true);
  });

  it("rejects malformed / unsupported key prefixes", () => {
    expect(isValidSshKeyFormat("")).toBe(false);
    expect(isValidSshKeyFormat("not-a-key")).toBe(false);
    expect(isValidSshKeyFormat("ssh-dss AAAAB3NzaC1kc3M=")).toBe(false);
    // Case-sensitive prefix check — uppercase should be rejected.
    expect(isValidSshKeyFormat("SSH-RSA AAAA")).toBe(false);
  });

  it("rejects keys with leading whitespace (contract preserves strict prefix)", () => {
    expect(isValidSshKeyFormat(" ssh-ed25519 AAAA")).toBe(false);
  });
});

describe("ssh keys — fingerprint shape", () => {
  it("produces a SHA256:… fingerprint without padding", async () => {
    const fp = await computeFingerprint(
      "ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIEXAMPLEBYTESHERE"
    );
    expect(fp.startsWith("SHA256:")).toBe(true);
    expect(fp.endsWith("=")).toBe(false);
  });

  it("is deterministic for the same key body", async () => {
    const k = "ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIEDETERMINISTICBYTES";
    expect(await computeFingerprint(k)).toBe(await computeFingerprint(k));
  });

  it("differs across distinct key bodies", async () => {
    const a = await computeFingerprint("ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAA");
    const b = await computeFingerprint("ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5BBBBB");
    expect(a).not.toBe(b);
  });
});

// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Route auth contract (no session cookie)
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

describe("ssh keys — /settings/keys auth guard", () => {
  it("GET /settings/keys without a session → redirect to /login", async () => {
    const res = await app.request("/settings/keys");
    expect(res.status).toBe(302);
    expect(res.headers.get("location") || "").toContain("/login");
  });

  it("POST /settings/keys (add) without a session → redirect to /login", async () => {
    const res = await app.request("/settings/keys", {
      method: "POST",
      headers: { "content-type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" },
      body: new URLSearchParams({
        title: "laptop",
        public_key: "ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIEXAMPLE alice",
      }),
    });
    expect(res.status).toBe(302);
    expect(res.headers.get("location") || "").toContain("/login");
  });

  it("POST /settings/keys/:id/delete without a session → redirect to /login", async () => {
    const res = await app.request(
      "/settings/keys/00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000/delete",
      { method: "POST" }
    );
    expect(res.status).toBe(302);
    expect(res.headers.get("location") || "").toContain("/login");
  });
});

// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// JSON API (Authorization-less) — same contract, but these live under
// /api/user/keys where the redirect target is still /login.
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

describe("ssh keys — /api/user/keys auth guard", () => {
  it("GET /api/user/keys without a session → redirect to /login (302)", async () => {
    const res = await app.request("/api/user/keys");
    expect(res.status).toBe(302);
    expect(res.headers.get("location") || "").toContain("/login");
  });

  it("POST /api/user/keys without a session → redirect to /login (302)", async () => {
    const res = await app.request("/api/user/keys", {
      method: "POST",
      headers: { "content-type": "application/json" },
      body: JSON.stringify({
        title: "laptop",
        public_key: "ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAI alice",
      }),
    });
    expect(res.status).toBe(302);
    expect(res.headers.get("location") || "").toContain("/login");
  });

  it("DELETE /api/user/keys/:id without a session → redirect to /login (302)", async () => {
    const res = await app.request(
      "/api/user/keys/00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000",
      { method: "DELETE" }
    );
    expect(res.status).toBe(302);
    expect(res.headers.get("location") || "").toContain("/login");
  });

  it("POST /api/user/keys rejects an invalid PAT bearer with 401 JSON", async () => {
    // `requireAuth` must 401 for Bearer tokens (JSON), NOT redirect.
    const res = await app.request("/api/user/keys", {
      method: "POST",
      headers: {
        "content-type": "application/json",
        authorization: "Bearer glc_notarealtoken1234567890",
      },
      body: JSON.stringify({
        title: "ci",
        public_key: "ssh-ed25519 AAAA",
      }),
    });
    if (HAS_DB) {
      expect(res.status).toBe(401);
      const body = await res.json().catch(() => null);
      expect(body && body.error).toBeTruthy();
    } else {
      // Without a DB the PAT loader catches and returns null; requireAuth
      // then returns 401 JSON from its invalid-bearer branch.
      expect(res.status).toBe(401);
    }
  });
});