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* SSRF guard — P1 security hardening (BUILD_BIBLE §7).
*
* Server-side fetches of user-controlled URLs (webhook deliveries, repo
* mirror upstreams) must not be allowed to reach private / internal
* address space: cloud metadata endpoints (169.254.169.254), localhost
* services, RFC1918 LANs, etc.
*
* Primary defence is the *synchronous literal check* — `isPrivateAddress()`
* recognises hostname conventions (localhost, .local, .internal), every
* private/reserved IPv4 range (including decimal/hex/octal single-integer
* encodings like `http://2130706433/`), and the private IPv6 forms
* (::1, ::, fc00::/7, fe80::/10, IPv4-mapped ::ffff:x.x.x.x).
*
* `resolvesToPrivate()` adds a best-effort DNS layer: if a public-looking
* hostname resolves to a private address it can be blocked too. Resolution
* failures never block — the subsequent connect would fail anyway.
*
* Escape hatches (read at call time, never at module load):
* - SSRF_ALLOW_PRIVATE=1 — disable blocking entirely (local dev /
* self-hosted setups that legitimately mirror internal git servers).
* - test env default-allow — when NODE_ENV/BUN_ENV is "test" (and not
* production), blocking is OFF unless SSRF_ENFORCE_IN_TEST=1. Existing
* suites spin up Bun.serve() on localhost and must keep passing; the
* ssrf-guard suite opts back in via SSRF_ENFORCE_IN_TEST=1.
*/
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// IPv4 parsing — inet_aton-compatible (1–4 parts, decimal/hex/octal).
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
/** Parse one IPv4 component: decimal, 0x-hex, or 0-prefixed octal. */
function parseIpv4Part(s: string): number | null {
if (!/^(0x[0-9a-f]+|[0-9]+)$/.test(s)) return null;
let v: number;
if (s.startsWith("0x")) {
v = parseInt(s.slice(2), 16);
} else if (s.length > 1 && s.startsWith("0")) {
// Leading zero → octal (inet_aton semantics, so 0177.0.0.1 = 127.0.0.1).
if (!/^[0-7]+$/.test(s)) return null;
v = parseInt(s, 8);
} else {
v = parseInt(s, 10);
}
return Number.isFinite(v) ? v : null;
}
/**
* Parse an IPv4 literal into a 32-bit unsigned integer, accepting the
* 1/2/3/4-part forms inet_aton accepts (so `2130706433`, `0x7f000001`,
* `0177.0.0.1`, and `127.1` all map to 127.0.0.1). Returns null when the
* string is not an IPv4 literal (e.g. a normal hostname).
*/
export function parseIpv4(host: string): number | null {
const parts = host.split(".");
if (parts.length < 1 || parts.length > 4) return null;
const nums: number[] = [];
for (const p of parts) {
const v = parseIpv4Part(p);
if (v === null) return null;
nums.push(v);
}
const n = nums.length;
if (n === 1) {
if (nums[0]! > 0xffffffff) return null;
return nums[0]! >>> 0;
}
// All but the last part are single octets; the last fills the remainder.
for (let i = 0; i < n - 1; i++) {
if (nums[i]! > 0xff) return null;
}
const lastMax = [0, 0, 0xffffff, 0xffff, 0xff][n]!;
if (nums[n - 1]! > lastMax) return null;
let prefix = 0;
for (let i = 0; i < n - 1; i++) {
prefix = prefix * 256 + nums[i]!;
}
return (prefix * 2 ** ((5 - n) * 8) + nums[n - 1]!) >>> 0;
}
/** True when a 32-bit IPv4 address falls in a private/reserved range. */
function isPrivateIpv4(ip: number): boolean {
const a = (ip >>> 24) & 0xff;
const b = (ip >>> 16) & 0xff;
if (a === 127) return true; // 127.0.0.0/8 loopback
if (a === 10) return true; // 10.0.0.0/8
if (a === 172 && b >= 16 && b <= 31) return true; // 172.16.0.0/12
if (a === 192 && b === 168) return true; // 192.168.0.0/16
if (a === 169 && b === 254) return true; // 169.254.0.0/16 link-local/metadata
if (a === 100 && b >= 64 && b <= 127) return true; // 100.64.0.0/10 CGNAT
if (a === 0) return true; // 0.0.0.0/8 "this network"
if (ip === 0xffffffff) return true; // 255.255.255.255 broadcast
return false;
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// IPv6 parsing — 8×16-bit words, with :: compression and embedded IPv4.
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
/** Convert colon-separated groups to 16-bit words (embedded IPv4 → 2 words). */
function groupsToWords(groups: string[]): number[] | null {
const words: number[] = [];
for (let i = 0; i < groups.length; i++) {
const g = groups[i]!;
if (g.includes(".")) {
// Embedded IPv4 — only valid in the final position.
if (i !== groups.length - 1) return null;
const v4 = parseIpv4(g);
if (v4 === null) return null;
words.push((v4 >>> 16) & 0xffff, v4 & 0xffff);
} else {
if (!/^[0-9a-f]{1,4}$/.test(g)) return null;
words.push(parseInt(g, 16));
}
}
return words;
}
/** Parse an IPv6 literal into 8 words, or null if it isn't one. */
function parseIpv6(input: string): number[] | null {
let h = input;
const pct = h.indexOf("%"); // strip zone id (fe80::1%eth0)
if (pct !== -1) h = h.slice(0, pct);
if (h.length === 0) return null;
const dbl = h.split("::");
if (dbl.length > 2) return null;
if (dbl.length === 2) {
const head = dbl[0] === "" ? [] : dbl[0]!.split(":");
const tail = dbl[1] === "" ? [] : dbl[1]!.split(":");
const headW = groupsToWords(head);
const tailW = groupsToWords(tail);
if (!headW || !tailW) return null;
const fill = 8 - headW.length - tailW.length;
if (fill < 1) return null;
return [...headW, ...new Array(fill).fill(0), ...tailW];
}
const words = groupsToWords(h.split(":"));
if (!words || words.length !== 8) return null;
return words;
}
/** True when an IPv6 literal is loopback/unspecified/ULA/link-local/mapped-private. */
function isPrivateIpv6(host: string): boolean {
const w = parseIpv6(host);
if (!w) return false; // not a parseable literal — connect will fail anyway
if (w.every((x) => x === 0)) return true; // :: unspecified
if (w.slice(0, 7).every((x) => x === 0) && w[7] === 1) return true; // ::1
if ((w[0]! & 0xfe00) === 0xfc00) return true; // fc00::/7 ULA
if ((w[0]! & 0xffc0) === 0xfe80) return true; // fe80::/10 link-local
// IPv4-mapped ::ffff:a.b.c.d (and the bare ::a.b.c.d compat form).
if (w[0] === 0 && w[1] === 0 && w[2] === 0 && w[3] === 0 && w[4] === 0) {
if (w[5] === 0xffff || (w[5] === 0 && (w[6] !== 0 || w[7]! > 1))) {
const ip = ((w[6]! << 16) | w[7]!) >>> 0;
return isPrivateIpv4(ip);
}
}
return false;
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Public surface
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
/**
* Pure, synchronous check: is `host` a private/internal address or a
* hostname that conventionally maps to one? Accepts bare hostnames, IPv4
* literals in any inet_aton encoding, and IPv6 literals (with or without
* the URL bracket form `[::1]`).
*/
export function isPrivateAddress(host: string): boolean {
if (!host) return true; // empty host — nothing legitimate to reach
let h = host.trim().toLowerCase();
if (h.endsWith(".")) h = h.slice(0, -1); // trailing-dot FQDN form
if (h.startsWith("[") && h.endsWith("]")) h = h.slice(1, -1);
if (h.length === 0) return true;
// Hostname conventions.
if (h === "localhost" || h.endsWith(".localhost")) return true;
if (h.endsWith(".local") || h.endsWith(".internal")) return true;
// IPv6 literal.
if (h.includes(":")) return isPrivateIpv6(h);
// IPv4 literal (any encoding). Non-literals fall through as public —
// the optional DNS layer (resolvesToPrivate) covers resolved names.
const v4 = parseIpv4(h);
if (v4 !== null) return isPrivateIpv4(v4);
return false;
}
/**
* Should private addresses be allowed right now? Read at call time, never
* cached at module load.
*
* - `SSRF_ALLOW_PRIVATE=1` → always allow (local dev / self-hosted).
* - Test env (NODE_ENV/BUN_ENV "test", and NOT production) → allow unless
* `SSRF_ENFORCE_IN_TEST=1`. Belt-and-braces mirrors rate-limit.ts: a
* leaked test env var in a production container must not drop the guard.
*/
export function ssrfPrivateAllowed(): boolean {
if (process.env.SSRF_ALLOW_PRIVATE === "1") return true;
const isTestEnv =
process.env.NODE_ENV !== "production" &&
(process.env.NODE_ENV === "test" || process.env.BUN_ENV === "test");
return isTestEnv && process.env.SSRF_ENFORCE_IN_TEST !== "1";
}
export type PublicUrlResult =
| { ok: true; url: URL }
| { ok: false; reason: string };
export interface PublicUrlOptions {
/** Explicit override; when omitted, env policy (ssrfPrivateAllowed) applies. */
allowPrivate?: boolean;
/** Allowed schemes incl. trailing colon. Default: http/https. */
schemes?: string[];
}
const DEFAULT_SCHEMES = ["http:", "https:"];
/**
* Validate a user-supplied URL for server-side fetching. Requires an
* http/https scheme (callers may widen via `opts.schemes`, e.g. git: for
* mirrors) and rejects private hosts per `isPrivateAddress()`.
*
* Embedded credentials (https://user:pw@host/) are deliberately allowed —
* mirror upstreams legitimately use them; callers strip them from logs.
*
* Never throws.
*/
export function assertPublicUrl(
raw: string,
opts?: PublicUrlOptions
): PublicUrlResult {
let url: URL;
try {
url = new URL(raw);
} catch {
return { ok: false, reason: "invalid URL" };
}
const schemes = opts?.schemes ?? DEFAULT_SCHEMES;
if (!schemes.includes(url.protocol)) {
return { ok: false, reason: `unsupported scheme ${url.protocol.replace(/:$/, "")}` };
}
const allowPrivate = opts?.allowPrivate ?? ssrfPrivateAllowed();
if (allowPrivate) return { ok: true, url };
if (!url.hostname) {
return { ok: false, reason: "missing host" };
}
if (isPrivateAddress(url.hostname)) {
return { ok: false, reason: "private address" };
}
return { ok: true, url };
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Optional async DNS layer — best-effort, injectable for tests.
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
export type DnsResolver = (
host: string
) => Promise<Array<{ address: string }>>;
async function defaultResolver(host: string) {
const { lookup } = await import("node:dns/promises");
return lookup(host, { all: true });
}
/**
* True when `host` is a private literal OR resolves (A/AAAA) to a private
* address. Best-effort by design: if resolution fails or times out we do
* NOT block — the literal check above is the primary defence and a
* non-resolving host can't be fetched anyway.
*/
export async function resolvesToPrivate(
host: string,
resolver: DnsResolver = defaultResolver
): Promise<boolean> {
if (isPrivateAddress(host)) return true;
try {
const records = await resolver(host);
return records.some((r) => isPrivateAddress(r.address));
} catch {
return false;
}
}
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