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bounded-gunzip.ts3.0 KB · 89 lines
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/**
 * Size-bounded gzip decompression.
 *
 * `Bun.gunzipSync` has two properties that make it unsafe on a request path
 * carrying attacker-controlled bytes:
 *
 *   1. No output bound. gzip reaches compression ratios past 1000:1 on
 *      repetitive input, so a 10 MB upload expands to ~10 GB in memory. The
 *      process is killed long before that completes.
 *   2. It is synchronous. Decompression blocks the event loop for its whole
 *      duration, so a single large body stalls every other request the
 *      server is handling — a latency DoS independent of the memory one.
 *
 * This helper streams through `DecompressionStream`, checks a running total
 * after every chunk, and aborts the moment the budget is exceeded. Memory is
 * bounded by `limit` rather than by the compression ratio, and awaiting each
 * chunk yields to the event loop instead of monopolising it.
 */

/** Thrown when decompressed output exceeds the caller's budget. */
export class DecompressedTooLargeError extends Error {
  readonly limit: number;
  constructor(limit: number) {
    super(`decompressed body exceeds ${limit} bytes`);
    this.name = "DecompressedTooLargeError";
    this.limit = limit;
  }
}

/**
 * Default ceiling for a git push body after decompression.
 *
 * Generous on purpose: git objects inside a packfile are already zlib
 * compressed, so a genuine push gzips at close to 1:1 and a real one this
 * large would be extraordinary. A bomb, by contrast, blows through this
 * within the first few chunks and is cut off there.
 */
export const MAX_GIT_BODY_BYTES = 1024 * 1024 * 1024; // 1 GiB

/** True if `bytes` starts with the gzip magic number. */
export function isGzip(bytes: Uint8Array): boolean {
  return bytes.length >= 2 && bytes[0] === 0x1f && bytes[1] === 0x8b;
}

/**
 * Decompress `input`, refusing to buffer more than `limit` bytes of output.
 *
 * @throws {DecompressedTooLargeError} as soon as the budget is exceeded —
 *   before the offending data is retained, not after.
 */
export async function gunzipBounded(
  input: Uint8Array,
  limit: number = MAX_GIT_BODY_BYTES
): Promise<Uint8Array> {
  const stream = new Blob([input as BlobPart])
    .stream()
    .pipeThrough(new DecompressionStream("gzip"));

  const reader = stream.getReader();
  const chunks: Uint8Array[] = [];
  let total = 0;

  try {
    while (true) {
      const { done, value } = await reader.read();
      if (done) break;
      if (!value) continue;

      total += value.byteLength;
      // Check BEFORE retaining the chunk, so exceeding the budget never
      // costs more than one chunk of headroom.
      if (total > limit) {
        throw new DecompressedTooLargeError(limit);
      }
      chunks.push(value);
    }
  } finally {
    // Releases the underlying source whether we finished or bailed out.
    reader.cancel().catch(() => {});
  }

  const out = new Uint8Array(total);
  let offset = 0;
  for (const chunk of chunks) {
    out.set(chunk, offset);
    offset += chunk.byteLength;
  }
  return out;
}