Pre-launch — Gluecron is in final validation. Public signups and git hosting for non-owner users open after launch review.
CodeIssuesDiscussionsWikiPull RequestsProjectsCommitsActionsReleasesContributorsPulse● GatesSecuritySettingsDeploymentsPipelineInsightsAgents✨ Explain✨ Ask AI✨ Workspace✨ Spec✨ Tests▓ Debt Map✨ NL Search🏛 Archaeology
claude/adoring-hopper-5x74bqclaude/affectionate-feynman-ykrf1hclaude/architecture-audit-design-wxprenclaude/build-status-update-3MXsfclaude/charming-meitner-mllb5rclaude/compare-gate-gluecron-s4mFQclaude/confident-faraday-tikcwbclaude/continue-work-XMTlIclaude/crontech-gluecron-deploy-7MIECclaude/crontech-platform-setup-SeKfwclaude/design-2026claude/ecstatic-ptolemy-jMdigclaude/enhance-github-integration-QNHdGclaude/fix-aa-loop-issue-PonMQclaude/fix-actions-and-processclaude/fix-desktop-errors-XqoW8claude/fix-red-workflowsclaude/fix-website-access-6FKJNclaude/gatetest-integration-hardeningclaude/github-audit-improvements-bDFr9claude/gluecron-launch-status-FoMRlclaude/hopeful-lamport-olfCTclaude/issue-to-pr-and-protectionsclaude/jolly-heisenberg-2sg1Qclaude/launch-preparation-QmTb6claude/new-session-xk1l7claude/plan-platform-architecture-kkN4yclaude/platform-analysis-roadmap-1nUGLclaude/platform-launch-assessment-8dWV8claude/polish-platform-release-AeDrUclaude/resume-previous-work-KzyLwclaude/review-crontech-handoff-qYEVqclaude/review-project-completeness-lHhS2claude/review-readme-docs-ulqPKclaude/serene-edison-rj87weclaude/setup-multi-repo-dev-BCwNQclaude/ship-fixes-and-tests-Jvz1cclaude/site-audit-competitive-pctlwgclaude/site-migration-vercel-XstpKclaude/standalone-product-repos-XHFTDcopilot/feat-smart-empty-states-keyboard-first-enhancementcopilot/feat-smart-morning-digest-review-context-restorecopilot/fix-and-process-workflowscopilot/update-ai-powered-code-reviewfeat/debt-mapfeat/push-policy-codeowners-hardeningfeat/smart-digest-contextfeat/stage-impactfeat/t1-secret-migrationfeat/u-polishfeat/w-self-hostfeat/w2-claude-configfix/agent-journey-orphan-sweepgatetest/auto-fix-1776586424172gatetest/auto-fix-1776586534814gatetest/auto-fix-1776590685143gatetest/auto-fix-1776590808199mainops/redeploy-retriggerstyle/dxt-cta-themeworktree-agent-a3377aad30d55da26worktree-agent-a7ef607b7ee1d6c74
csrf.test.ts6.9 KB · 227 lines
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
/**
 * CSRF middleware — same-origin (Origin/Referer) defence + double-submit
 * cookie token fallback.
 *
 * The platform was previously broken in production for logged-in users:
 * the global `csrfProtect` middleware required a token on every POST but
 * ~40+ web-UI forms didn't include one, so every authenticated form
 * submission returned 403. The middleware now accepts a request iff EITHER:
 *
 *   1) Origin/Referer header matches the request host (same-origin), OR
 *   2) The legacy double-submit cookie token check passes.
 *
 * These tests lock in that behaviour so a future refactor cannot silently
 * regress it.
 */

import { describe, it, expect } from "bun:test";
import { Hono } from "hono";
import { csrfToken, csrfProtect } from "../middleware/csrf";

function buildApp() {
  const app = new Hono();
  app.use("*", csrfToken);
  app.use("*", csrfProtect);
  app.get("/echo", (c) => c.text("ok"));
  app.post("/echo", (c) => c.text("ok"));
  return app;
}

describe("csrfProtect — request-method gating", () => {
  it("lets GET requests through unconditionally", async () => {
    const app = buildApp();
    const res = await app.request("/echo");
    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
  });

  it("lets HEAD/OPTIONS pass the csrf gate (does not 403)", async () => {
    const app = buildApp();
    const head = await app.request("/echo", { method: "HEAD" });
    const opts = await app.request("/echo", { method: "OPTIONS" });
    // The middleware does not return 403 — any non-200 status here means
    // the route handler didn't accept the method, not that CSRF rejected.
    expect(head.status).not.toBe(403);
    expect(opts.status).not.toBe(403);
  });
});

describe("csrfProtect — skip paths", () => {
  it("skips when no session cookie is present (anonymous user)", async () => {
    const app = buildApp();
    // No `session` cookie → anonymous → not a CSRF target
    const res = await app.request("/echo", { method: "POST" });
    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
  });

  it("skips API routes (/api/*) regardless of method", async () => {
    const app = new Hono();
    app.use("*", csrfToken);
    app.use("*", csrfProtect);
    app.post("/api/anything", (c) => c.text("ok"));

    const res = await app.request("/api/anything", {
      method: "POST",
      headers: { cookie: "session=fake-session-cookie" },
    });
    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
  });

  it("skips Bearer-authenticated requests", async () => {
    const app = buildApp();
    const res = await app.request("/echo", {
      method: "POST",
      headers: {
        cookie: "session=fake",
        authorization: "Bearer some-token-here",
      },
    });
    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
  });
});

describe("csrfProtect — same-origin defence (Origin/Referer)", () => {
  it("accepts POST when Origin matches request host", async () => {
    const app = buildApp();
    const res = await app.request("/echo", {
      method: "POST",
      headers: {
        cookie: "session=fake",
        host: "gluecron.example.com",
        origin: "https://gluecron.example.com",
      },
    });
    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
  });

  it("accepts POST when Origin matches host with a non-default port", async () => {
    const app = buildApp();
    const res = await app.request("/echo", {
      method: "POST",
      headers: {
        cookie: "session=fake",
        host: "localhost:3000",
        origin: "http://localhost:3000",
      },
    });
    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
  });

  it("accepts POST when Referer matches host (browser may strip Origin)", async () => {
    const app = buildApp();
    const res = await app.request("/echo", {
      method: "POST",
      headers: {
        cookie: "session=fake",
        host: "gluecron.example.com",
        referer: "https://gluecron.example.com/some/page",
      },
    });
    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
  });

  it("rejects POST when Origin is an attacker site", async () => {
    const app = buildApp();
    const res = await app.request("/echo", {
      method: "POST",
      headers: {
        cookie: "session=fake",
        host: "gluecron.example.com",
        origin: "https://evil.example.com",
      },
    });
    expect(res.status).toBe(403);
  });

  it("rejects POST when Referer is an attacker site", async () => {
    const app = buildApp();
    const res = await app.request("/echo", {
      method: "POST",
      headers: {
        cookie: "session=fake",
        host: "gluecron.example.com",
        referer: "https://evil.example.com/page",
      },
    });
    expect(res.status).toBe(403);
  });

  it("rejects POST when Origin and Referer are both absent and no token cookie", async () => {
    const app = buildApp();
    const res = await app.request("/echo", {
      method: "POST",
      headers: { cookie: "session=fake" },
    });
    expect(res.status).toBe(403);
  });

  it("rejects POST when Origin is a malformed URL", async () => {
    const app = buildApp();
    const res = await app.request("/echo", {
      method: "POST",
      headers: {
        cookie: "session=fake",
        host: "gluecron.example.com",
        origin: "::::not a url::::",
      },
    });
    expect(res.status).toBe(403);
  });
});

describe("csrfProtect — double-submit token fallback", () => {
  it("accepts POST with matching token in header even when Origin is missing", async () => {
    const app = buildApp();
    const res = await app.request("/echo", {
      method: "POST",
      headers: {
        cookie: "session=fake; csrf_token=abc123",
        "x-csrf-token": "abc123",
      },
    });
    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
  });

  it("rejects POST with mismatched token", async () => {
    const app = buildApp();
    const res = await app.request("/echo", {
      method: "POST",
      headers: {
        cookie: "session=fake; csrf_token=abc123",
        "x-csrf-token": "wrong-token",
      },
    });
    expect(res.status).toBe(403);
  });

  it("accepts POST with matching token in form body", async () => {
    const app = buildApp();
    const body = new URLSearchParams({ _csrf: "abc123", other: "field" });
    const res = await app.request("/echo", {
      method: "POST",
      headers: {
        cookie: "session=fake; csrf_token=abc123",
        "content-type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded",
      },
      body: body.toString(),
    });
    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
  });
});

describe("csrfToken — cookie setter", () => {
  it("sets a csrf_token cookie on first request when none exists", async () => {
    const app = buildApp();
    const res = await app.request("/echo");
    const setCookie = res.headers.get("set-cookie") || "";
    expect(setCookie).toContain("csrf_token=");
  });

  it("does not overwrite an existing csrf_token cookie", async () => {
    const app = buildApp();
    const res = await app.request("/echo", {
      headers: { cookie: "csrf_token=existing-value" },
    });
    const setCookie = res.headers.get("set-cookie") || "";
    expect(setCookie).not.toContain("csrf_token=");
  });
});