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* CSRF middleware — same-origin (Origin/Referer) defence + double-submit
* cookie token fallback.
*
* The platform was previously broken in production for logged-in users:
* the global `csrfProtect` middleware required a token on every POST but
* ~40+ web-UI forms didn't include one, so every authenticated form
* submission returned 403. The middleware now accepts a request iff EITHER:
*
* 1) Origin/Referer header matches the request host (same-origin), OR
* 2) The legacy double-submit cookie token check passes.
*
* These tests lock in that behaviour so a future refactor cannot silently
* regress it.
*/
import { describe, it, expect } from "bun:test";
import { Hono } from "hono";
import { csrfToken, csrfProtect } from "../middleware/csrf";
function buildApp() {
const app = new Hono();
app.use("*", csrfToken);
app.use("*", csrfProtect);
app.get("/echo", (c) => c.text("ok"));
app.post("/echo", (c) => c.text("ok"));
return app;
}
describe("csrfProtect — request-method gating", () => {
it("lets GET requests through unconditionally", async () => {
const app = buildApp();
const res = await app.request("/echo");
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
});
it("lets HEAD/OPTIONS pass the csrf gate (does not 403)", async () => {
const app = buildApp();
const head = await app.request("/echo", { method: "HEAD" });
const opts = await app.request("/echo", { method: "OPTIONS" });
// The middleware does not return 403 — any non-200 status here means
// the route handler didn't accept the method, not that CSRF rejected.
expect(head.status).not.toBe(403);
expect(opts.status).not.toBe(403);
});
});
describe("csrfProtect — skip paths", () => {
it("skips when no session cookie is present (anonymous user)", async () => {
const app = buildApp();
// No `session` cookie → anonymous → not a CSRF target
const res = await app.request("/echo", { method: "POST" });
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
});
it("skips API routes (/api/*) regardless of method", async () => {
const app = new Hono();
app.use("*", csrfToken);
app.use("*", csrfProtect);
app.post("/api/anything", (c) => c.text("ok"));
const res = await app.request("/api/anything", {
method: "POST",
headers: { cookie: "session=fake-session-cookie" },
});
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
});
it("skips Bearer-authenticated requests", async () => {
const app = buildApp();
const res = await app.request("/echo", {
method: "POST",
headers: {
cookie: "session=fake",
authorization: "Bearer some-token-here",
},
});
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
});
});
describe("csrfProtect — same-origin defence (Origin/Referer)", () => {
it("accepts POST when Origin matches request host", async () => {
const app = buildApp();
const res = await app.request("/echo", {
method: "POST",
headers: {
cookie: "session=fake",
host: "gluecron.example.com",
origin: "https://gluecron.example.com",
},
});
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
});
it("accepts POST when Origin matches host with a non-default port", async () => {
const app = buildApp();
const res = await app.request("/echo", {
method: "POST",
headers: {
cookie: "session=fake",
host: "localhost:3000",
origin: "http://localhost:3000",
},
});
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
});
it("accepts POST when Referer matches host (browser may strip Origin)", async () => {
const app = buildApp();
const res = await app.request("/echo", {
method: "POST",
headers: {
cookie: "session=fake",
host: "gluecron.example.com",
referer: "https://gluecron.example.com/some/page",
},
});
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
});
it("rejects POST when Origin is an attacker site", async () => {
const app = buildApp();
const res = await app.request("/echo", {
method: "POST",
headers: {
cookie: "session=fake",
host: "gluecron.example.com",
origin: "https://evil.example.com",
},
});
expect(res.status).toBe(403);
});
it("rejects POST when Referer is an attacker site", async () => {
const app = buildApp();
const res = await app.request("/echo", {
method: "POST",
headers: {
cookie: "session=fake",
host: "gluecron.example.com",
referer: "https://evil.example.com/page",
},
});
expect(res.status).toBe(403);
});
it("rejects POST when Origin and Referer are both absent and no token cookie", async () => {
const app = buildApp();
const res = await app.request("/echo", {
method: "POST",
headers: { cookie: "session=fake" },
});
expect(res.status).toBe(403);
});
it("rejects POST when Origin is a malformed URL", async () => {
const app = buildApp();
const res = await app.request("/echo", {
method: "POST",
headers: {
cookie: "session=fake",
host: "gluecron.example.com",
origin: "::::not a url::::",
},
});
expect(res.status).toBe(403);
});
});
describe("csrfProtect — double-submit token fallback", () => {
it("accepts POST with matching token in header even when Origin is missing", async () => {
const app = buildApp();
const res = await app.request("/echo", {
method: "POST",
headers: {
cookie: "session=fake; csrf_token=abc123",
"x-csrf-token": "abc123",
},
});
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
});
it("rejects POST with mismatched token", async () => {
const app = buildApp();
const res = await app.request("/echo", {
method: "POST",
headers: {
cookie: "session=fake; csrf_token=abc123",
"x-csrf-token": "wrong-token",
},
});
expect(res.status).toBe(403);
});
it("accepts POST with matching token in form body", async () => {
const app = buildApp();
const body = new URLSearchParams({ _csrf: "abc123", other: "field" });
const res = await app.request("/echo", {
method: "POST",
headers: {
cookie: "session=fake; csrf_token=abc123",
"content-type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded",
},
body: body.toString(),
});
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
});
});
describe("csrfToken — cookie setter", () => {
it("sets a csrf_token cookie on first request when none exists", async () => {
const app = buildApp();
const res = await app.request("/echo");
const setCookie = res.headers.get("set-cookie") || "";
expect(setCookie).toContain("csrf_token=");
});
it("does not overwrite an existing csrf_token cookie", async () => {
const app = buildApp();
const res = await app.request("/echo", {
headers: { cookie: "csrf_token=existing-value" },
});
const setCookie = res.headers.get("set-cookie") || "";
expect(setCookie).not.toContain("csrf_token=");
});
});
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